him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States". [Emphasis supplied in original]

NOTE: By law, a judge is a state officer.

Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers". **Elliot v. Piersol**, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1878)

U.S. v. Dixon, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993), the Court clarified the use of the same elements test set forth in Blockburger when it over-ruled the same conduct test announced in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecutions only when the previously concluded and subsequently charged offenses fail the same elements test articulated in Blockburger. See also Gavieres v. U.S., 220 U.S. 338, 345 (1911) (early precedent establishing that in a subsequent prosecution [w]hile it is true that the conduct of the accused was one and the same, two offenses resulted, each of which had an element not embraced in the other).

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY:

See Judicial Immunity page for more citations (links) and news articles regarding the topic.

See also, 42 USC 1983 Availability of Equitable Relief Against Judges.

Note: [Copied verbiage; we are not lawyers.] Judges have given themselves judicial immunity for their judicial functions. Judges have no judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act or for their administrative/ministerial duties, or for

violating a citizens constitutional rights. When a judge has a duty to act, he does not have discretion he is then not performing a judicial act; he is performing a ministerial act.

Nowhere was the judiciary given immunity, particularly nowhere in Article III; under our Constitution, if judges were to have immunity, it could only possibly be granted by amendment (and even less possibly by legislative act), as Art. I, Sections 9 & 10, respectively, in fact expressly prohibit such, stating, No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States and No state shall grant any Title of Nobility. Most of us are certain that Congress itself doesnt understand the inherent lack of immunity for judges.

Article III, Sec. 1, The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior.

Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Spring 1986 21 n3, p 509-516, Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that violate litigants civil rights. Robert Craig Waters.

ENGLISH TORT LAW

61. Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.); BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 23.

62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163-66 (1803) ("It is a general and indisputable rule, that where

there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is

invaded . . . . [F]or it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right,

when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.").

ENGLISH TORT LAW

Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep.

Facts

Mr Ashby was prevented from voting at an election by the misfeasance of a

constable, Mr White, on the apparent pretext that he was not a settled inhabitant.

At the time, the case attracted considerable national interest, and debates in Parliament. It was later known as the Aylesbury election case. In the Lords, it attracted the interest of Peter King, 1st Baron King who spoke and maintained the right of electors to have a remedy at common law for denial of their votes, against Tory insistence on the privileges of the Commons.

Sir Thomas Powys (c. 1649-1719) defended William White in the House of Lords. The argument submitted was that the Commons alone had the power to determine election cases, not the courts.

Judgment

Holt CJ was dissenting in his judgment in the High Court, but this was upheld by the House of Lords. He said at pp 273-4:
" If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it, and, indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal

And I am of the opinion that this action on the case is a proper action. My brother Powell indeed thinks that an action on the case is not maintainable, because there is no hurt or damage to the plaintiff, but surely every injury imports a damage, though it does not cost the party one farthing, and it is impossible to prove the contrary; for a damage is not merely pecuniary but an injury imports a damage, when a man is thereby hindered of his rights.

To allow this action will make publick officers more careful to observe the constitution of cities and boroughs, and not to be so partial as they

commonly are in all elections, which is indeed a great and growing mischief, and tends to the prejudice of the peace of the nation.

A Collection of Court Authorities
in re the
District Court of the United States
by

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

We begin with one of the great masters of Constitution, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing in the year 1828. Here, Justice Marshall make a very clear distinction between judicial courts, authorized by Article III, and legislative (territorial) courts,
authorized by Article IV. Marshall even utilizes some of the exact wording of Article IV to differentiate those courts from Article III judicial power courts, as follows:

These [territorial] courts then, are not Constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general rights of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be

exercised in the States in those courts only which are established in pursuance of the 3d article of the Constitution, the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of the State government.

[American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton]
[1 Pet. 511 (1828), emphasis added]
Though the judicial system set up in a Territory of the United States is a part of federal jurisdiction, the phrase court of the United States, when used in a federal statute, is generally construed as not referring to territorial courts.
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627. In Balzac, the high Court stated:

The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under Article III of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under Article IV, Section 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court. [Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312] [42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1921)]
Constitutional provision against diminution of compensation of federal judges was designed to secure independence of judiciary.[ODonoghue v. U.S., 289 U.S. 516 (1933)][headnote 2. Judges]
The term District Courts of the United States, as used in Criminal Appeals Rules, without an addition expressing a wider connotation, had its historic significance and described courts created under article 3 of Constitution, and did not include territorial courts. [Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201]

[headnote 2. Courts, emphasis added]

Where statute authorized Supreme Court to prescribe Criminal Appeals Rules in District Courts of the United States including named territorial courts, omission in rules when drafted of reference to District Court of Hawaii, and certain other of the named courts, indicated that Criminal Appeals Rules were not to apply to those [latter] courts.

[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201]

[headnote 4. Courts, emphasis added]

The following paragraph from Mookini is extraordinary for severalreasons:

(

1) it refers to the historic and proper sense of the term District Courts of the United States,

(2) it makes a key distinction between such courts and application of their rules to territorial courts;

(3) the application of the maxim inclusion unius est exclusio alterius is obvious here, namely, the omission of territorial courts clearly shows that they were intended to be omitted:

Not only did the promulgating order use the term District Courts of the United States in its historic and proper sense, but the omission of provisions for the application of the rules to the territorial courts and other courts mentioned in the authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended.

[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201]

[emphasis added]

The words district court of the United States commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III of the Constitution, not the legislative courts which have long been the courts of the Territories.

[Intl Longshoremens and Warehousemens Union et al.] v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952)] [emphasis added]

The phrase court of the United States, without more, means solely courts created by Congress under Article III of the Constitution and not territorial

courts.
[Intl Longshoremens and Warehousemens Union et al.]
[v. Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1948), headnote 1]
[emphasis added]
United States District Courts have only such jurisdiction as is conferred by an Act of Congress under the Constitution.
U.S.C.A. Const. art. 3, sec. 2; 28 U.S.C.A. 1344]
[Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir., 1972)]
[headnote 2. Courts]
The United States district courts are not courts of general jurisdiction. They have no jurisdiction except as prescribed by Congress pursuant to Article III of the Constitution. [many cites omitted]
[Graves v. Snead, 541 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1976)]
The question of jurisdiction in the court either over the person, the subject-matter or the place where the crime was committed can be raised at any stage of a criminal proceeding; it is never presumed, but must always be proved; and it is never waived by a defendant.
[U.S. v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (D.C.Ark. 1885)]
In a criminal proceeding lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be asserted at any time by collateral attack.
[U.S. v. Gernie, 228 F.Supp. 329 (D.C.N.Y. 1964)]
Jurisdiction of court may be challenged at any stage of the proceeding, and also may be challenged after conviction and execution of judgment by way of writ of habeas corpus.
[U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)]
The United States District Court has only such jurisdiction as Congress confers.
[Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin][191 F.Supp 245 (D.C.N.Y. 1960)]

U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989). DOUBLE JEOPARDY Being tried twice for the same offense; prohibited by the 5th Amendmen tto the U.S. Constitution. [T]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct

abuses: [1] a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; [2] a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and [3] multiple punishments for the same offense.

2 Am Jur 2d, page 129 (1962)
Administrative Law Section 301. Particular applications.
In application of the principles that the power of an administrative agency to make rules does not extend to the power to make legislation and that a regulation which is beyond the power of the agency to make is invalid, it has been held that an administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, and specifically a liability for a tax [fn 2] or inspection fee. [bold emphasis added]
Footnote 2:
2. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L.Ed.2d 127, 80 S.Ct. 144 (1959); Roberts v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 176 F.2d 221, 10 ALR.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1949) (regulations "can add nothing to income as defined by Congress." citing M.E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267, 279, 59 S.Ct. 186, 190, 83 L.Ed. 167 (1938)); Independent Petroleum Corp. v. Fly, 141 F.2d 189, 152 ALR 928 (5th Cir. 1944) (the power to make regulations does not extend to making taxpayers of those whom the Act, properly construed, does not tax); Indiana Dept. of State Revenue v. Colpaert Realty Corp., 231 Ind. 463, 109 NE.2d 415 (no power to render taxable a transaction which the statute did not make taxable); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. State Tax Com., 242 Iowa 33, 44 NW.2d 449, 41 ALR.2d 523 (use tax).
Liability for the payment of the sales tax is controlled by statute; it cannot be controlled by rulings or regulations of the board. Acorn Iron Works v. State Board of Tax Administration, 295 Mich. 143, 294 NW 126, 139 ALR 368. Annotation: 139 ALR 380 ("retail sale").

City of Canton v. Harris, 498 U.S. 378 (1989) failure to train train its officers adequately with respect to implementing the following Department policies:

Your Right of Defense Against Unlawful Arrest

"Citizens may resist unlawful arrest to the point of taking an arresting officers life if necessary." Plummer v. State, 136 Ind. 306. This premise was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case: John Bad Elk v. U.S., 177 U.S. 529. The Court stated: "Where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the right to make the arrest, from what it does if the officer had no right. What may be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed."

"An arrest made with a defective warrant, or one issued without affidavit, or one that fails to allege a crime is within jurisdiction, and one who is being arrested, may resist arrest and break away. lf the arresting officer is killed by one who is so resisting, the killing will be no more than an involuntary manslaughter." Housh v. People, 75 111. 491; reaffirmed and quoted in State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452; State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245; Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio 349; State v Rousseau, 241 P. 2d 447; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 3621.

"When a person, being without fault, is in a place where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self defense, his assailant is killed, he is justified." Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80; Miller v. State, 74 Ind. 1.

"These principles apply as well to an officer attempting to make an arrest, who abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully uses such force and violence." Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. I; Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex. App. 1 75; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 903.

"An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery." (State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260).

"Each person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such a case, the

person attempting the arrest stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may be resisted by the use of force, as in self- defense." (State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 100).

"One may come to the aid of another being unlawfully arrested, just as he may where one is being assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus it is not an offense to liberate one from the unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may have submitted to such custody, without resistance." (Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 910).

"Story affirmed the right of self-defense by persons held illegally. In his own writings, he had admitted that 'a situation could arise in which the checks-and-balances principle ceased to work and the various branches of government concurred in a gross usurpation.' There would be no usual remedy by changing the law or passing an amendment to the Constitution, should the oppressed party be a minority. Story concluded, 'If there be any remedy at all it is a remedy never provided for by human institutions.' That was the 'ultimate right of all human beings in extreme cases to resist oppression, and to apply force against ruinous injustice.'" (From Mutiny on the Amistad by Howard Jones, Oxford University Press, 1987, an account of the reading of the decision in the case by Justice Joseph Story of the Supreme Court.

As for grounds for arrest: "The carrying of arms in a quiet, peaceable, and orderly manner, concealed on or about the person, is not a breach of the peace. Nor does such an act of itself, lead to a breach of the peace." (Wharton's Criminal and Civil Procedure, 12th Ed., Vol.2: Judy v. Lashley, 5 W. Va. 628, 41 S.E. 197)

DECISIONS FOR RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Dear Law Enforcement Officer:

With all due respect,

Demand for Trial By Jury to First decide the innocence or guilt of this individual upon the instant matter is hereby made on all proceedings arising from charges made by this Officer or Department of Government.

Demand that Nature and Cause be proven into the record of the Court for any charges arising from charges made by this Officer or Department of Government is hereby demanded.

Please attach this document in its entirety with any charge, summons, or information you may make regarding me as this Document constitutes a specific demand for Jury trial to FIRST decide my innocence or guilt and that the Nature and Cause for said charge be proven in this or any matter arising out of this matter and that it must be made a part of the record of any and all proceedings as my communication to the court and as these demands are fully supported by the 6th amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America (the law of the land, all others notwithstanding).

I am hereby informing you that I do not consent to talk to you, and that I must insist, unless you are placing me under arrest, or can state specific and articulable facts which warrant your detaining me that you immediately leave me alone to go about my business, as is my right as a United States Citizen.

I am engaged in the ownership and use of Property belonging to me as I see fit to use it, and as is my Constitutional Right to do. My responsibility to that act does not extend beyond any harm my decision does to another. If you (the officer or applicable Department of Government) are attempting to curtail my free use of my property you are hereby requested to identify the injured party and to instruct said injured party articulate the specific harm I or my use of my property has caused, in writing and provided to me and to the applicable court.

Should you choose to ignore this request and to detain me or cause me costly litigation knowing that no injured party exists as a result of my actions, be advised you are very likely acting outside the authority of your office and your Sovereign immunity.

I am not operating a motor vehicle pursuant to TITLE 18 PART I CHAPTER 2 § 31Definitions (6) Motor vehicle.— The term "motor vehicle" means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo. Whereas I recognize it is your charge to protect the safety and welfare of citizenry, you must also see that I have not harmed nor caused to be harmed anyone. I state here and now that I have exercised my unalienable rights in a fashion that is within the meaning and protection of the U. S. Constitution and beyond that I have no responsibility.

In addition, as it is my opinion, this detention is completely about converting my money to the use of this municipality, city, county and/or state, I inform you that my property is also protected by the Constitution just mentioned and that my money is my property. I do not choose to surrender it nor any other right protected for me by that Constitution, nor could I if I did so choose.

In addition, be advised that any act on your part to proceed under color of law against me knowing full well I am not party to a contract which enables you to enforce traffic and property laws (unless, there is a real/true injured party willing to testify that I have done them harm) will be met with an aggressive and protracted and time consuming Court battle before a Jury of my peers.

I am party to NO contract (visible or invisible) with corporate body politics in the City of Clinton, County of Clinton, State of Iowa, or any other city,

county, state in the Union or the Federal Government. In clarification, I pay for the few services supplied by this government that I use with MONEY (the legal tender of this land i.e. Income tax, fuel tax, cigarette tax, sales tax, property tax, real estate tax ,,,,,, etc. etc. etc.). I DO NOT PAY WITH MY RIGHTS, as do most other Americans. Beyond that payment I am not indebted to this or any other government entity. As such, there can be no valid contract, (visible or invisible) which binds me to the laws by contract you are heretofore attempting to enforce.

I HAVE NO HISTORY OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND AM THEREBY NO THREAT TO YOUR SAFETY AS THAT FACT WILL NOT CHANGE NOW.

IN ADDITION

Any assumed contracts this court or this city may be acting in accordance with have been rescinded from their inception per Affidavit currently published at http://www.doprocess.net/

I was acting within my Rights with respect to the use I made of my property as is defined in Spann vs City of Dallas, Tx SC (1921)

and/or

I was exercising my Constitutional Right to travel in an automobile as pointed out in Chicago Motor Coach v Chicago quoted #169NE221 which says: Use of a highway for purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege but is a common and fundamental Right of which the Public and Individuals cannot be deprived.

Highways are for the use of the traveling public, and all have the right to use them in a reasonable and proper manner; the use thereof is an inalienable

right of every citizen. Escobedo v. State 35 C2d 870 in 8 Cal Jur 3d p.27

Users of the highway for transportation of persons and property for hire may be subjected to special regulations not applicable to those using the highway for public purposes. Richmond Baking Co. v. Department of Treasury 18 N.E. 2d 788.

The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the RIGHT to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the of a liberty within the meaning of the Constitutional guarantees. . .. Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 139 A2d 869, 872

The RIGHT of the citizen to DRIVE on the public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT which must be protected by the courts. People v. Horton 14 Cal. App. 3rd 667
(1971)

"A "US Citizen" upon leaving the District of Columbia becomes involved in "interstate commerce", as a "resident" does not have the common-law right to travel, of a Citizen of one of the several states." Hendrick v. Maryland S.C. Reporter's Rd. 610-625. (1914)

One who DRIVES an automobile is an operator within meaning of the Motor Vehicle Act. Pontius v. McClean 113 CA 452

The word operator shall not include any person who solely transports his own property and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation. Statutes at Large California Chapter 412 p.833

The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which he has under his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co., 229 Ky 731, 17 SW2d 1012, and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Smith 154 S.E. 579.

Also See:

EDWARDS VS. CALIFORNIA, 314 U.S. 160
TWINING VS NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78
WILLIAMS VS. FEARS, 179 U.S. 270, AT 274
CRANDALL VS. NEVADA, 6 WALL. 35, AT 43-44
THE PASSENGER CASES, 7 HOWARD 287, AT 492
U.S. VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, AT 757-758 (1966)
GRIFFIN VS. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88, AT 105-106 (1971)
CALIFANO VS. TORRES, 435 U.S. 1, AT 4, note 6
SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
CALIFANO VS. AZNAVORIAN, 439 U.S. 170, AT 176 (1978)
researched and furnished by George Mercier, Federal Judge (retired)

Further, If the Authority you are enforcing is assumed by you and your superiors to be an act of Police Power granted the State by the people pursuant to the States Right to provide for the Health and Welfare of all the people, I am informing you that the action to which you are undertaking now is beyond the scope and limits of such power of the State and I therefore demand that you cease and desist the present intervention. see Spann v City of Dallas, get cite at http://www.doprocess.net/

And finally, Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, to make sure all are informed regarding the fact that my fingerprints are private property which cannot be taken over your objection without a valid court order.

Be aware that in 1781 two men came here from England and created two Federal corporations, one was the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION" and the other "THE UNITED STATE CORPORATION". The control of the government transferred to the UNITED STATES CORPORATION at that time, which was one of the first ILLEGAL UNLAWFUL CONSTITUTIONAL ACTS of our GOVERNMENT. Following the precepts formulated by Colonel Mandel House, personal advisor to Woodrow Wilson (President of the United States) and an unknown member of the Illuminati, our country (a Dream of Baron Rothschild and the other members of the Illuminati are still being used by our Rulers to this date in their quest to take over and own the United States of America.

YOUR GOVERNMENTS DEFINITION OF THE WORD PERSON

The word person is used in many laws. If you dont know what the term means, you might think that you are one of these.

American Law and Procedure, Vol 13, page 137, 1910:

"This word `person and its scope and bearing in the law, involving, as it does, legal fictions and also apparently natural beings, it is difficult to understand; but it is absolutely necessary to grasp, at whatever cost, a true and proper understanding to the word in all the phases of its proper use A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the status or condition with which he is invested not an individual or physical person, but the status, condition or character borne by physical persons The law of persons is the law of status or condition.

People are not persons. On the next page you will read legal definitions of the word `person. As you will see, persons are defined as non-sovereigns. A sovereign is someone who is not subject to statutes. A person is someone who voluntarily submits himself to statutes.

In the United States the people are sovereign over their civil servants:

Romans 6:16 (NIV): Dont you know that when you offer yourselves to someone to obey him as slaves, you are slaves to the one whom you obey

Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F 939 @ 943:

The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the different departments of its government, but in the People, from whom the government emanated; and they may change it at their discretion. Sovereignty, then in this country, abides with the constituency, and not with the agent; and this remark is true, both in reference to the federal and state government.

1794 US Supreme Court case Glass v. Sloop Betsey:

Our government is founded upon compact. Sovereignty was, and is, in the people

1829 US Supreme Court case Lansing v. Smith:

People of a state are entitled to all rights which formerly belong to the King, by his prerogative.

US Supreme Court in 4 Wheat 402:

The United States, as a whole, emanates from the people The people, in their capacity as sovereigns, made and adopted the Constitution

US Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden, 48 US 1, 12 LEd 581:

The governments are but trustees acting under derived authority and have no power to delegate what is not delegated to them. But the people, as the original fountain might take away what they have delegated and intrust to whom they please. The sovereignty in every state resides in the people of the state and they may alter and change their form of government at their own pleasure.

US Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, page 370:

While sovereign powers are delegated to the government, sovereignty itself remains with the people..

Yick Wo is a powerful anti-discrimination case. You might get the impression that the legislature can write perfectly legal laws, yet the laws cannot be enforced contrary to the intent of the people. Its as if servants do not make rules for their masters. Its as if the Citizens who created government were their masters. Its as if civil servants were to obey the higher authority. You are the higher authority of Romans 13:1. You as ruler are not a terror to good works per Romans 13:3. Imagine that! Isnt it a

shame that your government was surrendered to those who are a terror to good works? Isnt it a shame that you enlisted to obey them?

US Supreme Court in Julliard v. Greenman, 110 US 421:

There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States . In this country sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution entrusted to it: All else is withheld.

US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 US 653, 667 (1979):

In common usage, the term person does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it.

US Supreme Court in U.S. v. Cooper, 312 US 600,604, 61 S.Ct 742 (1941):

Since in common usage the term `person does not include the sovereign, statutes employing that term are ordinarily construed to exclude it.

US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 67 SCt677 (1947):

In common usage, the term `person does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.

US Supreme Court in US v. Fox, 94 US 315:

Since in common usage, the term `person does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.

U.S. v. General Motors Corporation, D.C. Ill, 2 F.R.D. 528, 530:

In common usage the word `person does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are generally construed to exclude the sovereign.

Church of Scientology v. US Department of Justice, 612 F.2d 417 @425 (1979):

the word `person in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings., see e.g. 1, U.S.C. § para 1.

In the 1935 Supreme Court case of Perry v. US (294 US 330) the Supreme Court found that: